Public Law: Constitutional Law by Reynard, Charles A.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 15 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1953-1954 Term
February 1955
Public Law: Constitutional Law
Charles A. Reynard
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Charles A. Reynard, Public Law: Constitutional Law, 15 La. L. Rev. (1955)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol15/iss2/19
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
ing such trial. Adopting a dictum contained in the case of State
ex rel. Charles v. Board of Commissioners of Port of New Or-
leans,12 the court quoted with approval the rule that "if, on trial,
it is shown that [the employee] has not merited discharge, then
his suspension is a mere enforced vacation for which the board
must pay him as if he had never been suspended." One Justice
concurred separately on the ground that the rule adopted im-
pinges on the discretion of the City Civil Service Commission
to reinstate "under the conditions which it deems proper."'1
Such impingement is at least arguable, however, since the com-
mission had in this instance ordered reinstatement with full pay
and the decision can be construed as affirming this commission
decision.
The court did not discuss the departmental charges against
the officer on which no hearing was ever held; in effect they were
treated as quashed by the acquittal on the criminal charge. The
hard case, which the court was not called upon to decide here,
would arise where such charges had been filed, a hearing held
and removal based on findings ordered, followed some years later
by acquittal. Should the removal stand, despite the. later favor-
able court action? Avoidance of the impasse, where as here
departmental charges are based on the same conduct which has
given rise to criminal charges, would appear to lie in the proce-
dure which was followed in this case; departmental charges held
in abeyance pending a determination on the criminal charge with
such determination to be res judicata as to the departmental
charges. The rule adopted posits a "speedy trial" under these
circumstances; it will be incumbent upon the city to see that it
is obtained in order to protect its treasury.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Charles A. Reynard*
Significant principles of constitutional law were involved
in a small number of cases decided at the term. Several of
these decisions are discussed under appropriate substantive
headings in other portions of this symposium issue. Douglas Pub-
lic Service Corp. v. Gaspard,' declaring the state anti-injunction
12. 159 La. 69, 77, 105 So. 228, 230 (1925).
13. LA. R.S. 33:2424 (1950).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 74 So.2d 182 (La. 1954).
1955]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
labor legislation invalid as an infringement of due process of
law, is treated in the section on Labor Law. Chapman v. Shreve-
port,2 sustaining a city ordinance providing for the flouridation
of the municipal water supply against attack on the grounds of
due process and equal protection of the law, is discussed in the
section on Local Government and is likewise the subject of a
student note in this issue of the Review.
Constitutional issues of due process and equal protection
were raised, but decision on the points was avoided in State
v. Penniman,3 a criminal prosecution of the operator of a self-
service grocery store for violations of the state's Sunday law,
originally enacted in 1886. 4 The statute prohibits Sunday sales
by a broadly defined class of businesses, but sets forth exemp-
tions in favor of designated businesses, including "public and
private markets."' 5 The defendant offered three principal de-
fenses: (1) that his store was a "private market" within the
intendment of the exemption, and in the alternative (2) that
the statute was void for vagueness, more particularly for fail-
ure to define the term "private market," and (3) that the classi-
fications created by the exemptions (if not applicable to him)
were unreasonable and denied him equal protection of the law.
The court acknowledged the substantial body of its juris-
prudence which demands reasonable certainty in legislative defi-
nition of crime as a constituent of due process of law, and sug-
gested that the act in question approached the borderline for
failure to define the term "private market." However, by re-
sorting to statutory construction, and invoking the few extrinsic
aids available, the court was able to conclude that the defendant's
business was included within the term "private market." By
this process the court found it unnecessary to pass upon the con-
stitutional issues, and in so doing disposed of the case in accord-
ance with the well-settled maxim of constitutional law, that
where a case offers a means of decision on non-constitutional
grounds, the consideration of constitutional issues is to be
avoided. The constitutional issues tendered here were of con-
siderable difficulty as the court itself acknowledged on the due
process point. The equal protection issue had been decided ad-
2. 74 So.2d 142 (La. 1954).
3. 224 La. 95, 68 So.2d 770 (1953).
4. La. Acts 1886, No. 18, p. 28; LA. R.S. 51:191 et seq. (1950).
5. Id. § 192.
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versely to the defendant's contention in the 1947-1948 term in
a case of somewhat similar circumstances.6
A troublesome aspect of the privilege against incrimination
was presented incidentally in State v. Gray7 where the court
was confronted with a more dominating question of substan-
tive criminal law." This was a criminal case in which a witness
was called and gave his name but added, "I refuse to testify in
this trial. I am afraid I might say something to incriminate
myself." Thereafter, on prodding from the court he did give
his address, but declined to answer the question "Were you
shot?" As a consequence he was adjudged guilty of contempt
and sentenced by the court. The issue presented by these facts
is simply whether the incriminating character of the testimony
is to be determined by the witness or the court. In his opinion
for a unanimous court on this issue, Justice LeBlanc stated that
"The judge before whom he is testifying is the one to deter-
mine whether any testimony he would be called on to give
might prove to be of an incriminating nature."9 Despite occa-
sional statements to the contrary to be found in the cases in
some jurisdictions, this is regarded as the well-settled rule on
the subject.10 Admittedly, however, the rule is to be applied
in the light of the nature of the question, the surrounding cir-
cumstances and the nature of the case. On this point of the case
the court found the question itself to be innocuous and in the
absence of other circumstances tending to establish its incrimi-
nating character, affirmed the conviction. Imaginative counsel
might have disagreed, but in such a case it would be his duty
to make the record show the circumstances upon which he was
relying to demonstrate potential incrimination.
6. State v. Trahan, 214 La. 100, 36 So.2d 652 (1948), discussed in The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1947-1948 Term-Constitutional Law,
9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 161, 168 (1949).
7. 225 La. 38, 72 So.2d 3 (1954).
8. I.e., whether a witness called in a criminal proceeding and refusing
to answer a question propounded to him for which he is sentenced for con-
tempt, may thereafter be called in the same proceeding (twice on the same
day) and be further punished for successive refusals to answer the same
question. On this question the court's answer was in the negative.
9. 72 So.2d 3, 5 (La. 1954).
10. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951), and annotation in
95 L.Ed. 1126 (1951).
1955]
